

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12462 061726Z

73

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-07 DLOS-06

SAL-01 /102 W

----- 034888

R 061511Z AUG 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7291

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USLO PEKING

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 12462

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, KS, KN

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON KOREA

REF: (A) STATE 191941, (B) TOKYO 10382, (C) SINGAPORE 3489,  
(D) MOSCOW 5695

1. SUMMARY. IN AUG 5 CONVERSATION, SOVIET MFA COUNSELOR  
DEALING WITH KOREA:

-- SEPARATED "OFFICIAL" SOVIET REACTION BY GROMYKO TO  
SECRETARY'S MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL FROM SOVIET  
MEDIA SUPPORT OF NORTH KOREAN REJECTION:

-- EXPRESSED INTEREST IN U.S. - DPRK CONTACTS, BUT SAID  
THERE WAS NO CHANGE RE SOVIET-ROK CONTACTS;

-- SAID SOVIET-DPRK ECONOMIC RELATIONS WERE CONFINED  
TO TRADE, WHICH SHOWED LITTLE OR NO INCREASE, AND TECHNICAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 12462 061726Z

COOPERATION; THAT KONG JIN TAE VISIT WAS TO HELP WRAP UP

SOVIET 10TH 5YP FOR SEPTEMBER APPROVAL; AND THAT  
CREDITS ARE NOT BEING DISCUSSED;

-- CLAIMED SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN "OFFICIALLY"  
INFORMED OF NORTH KOREAN CLAIM TO 50-MILE SECURITY ZONE,  
BUT SUSPECT IT HAS MAINLY TO DO WITH FISHING.  
OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SOVIET-DPRK RELATIONS ARE STABLE  
AND CORRECT, BUT NOT PARTICULARLY NOT WARM, AND THAT SOVIETS HAVE NO  
INTENTION OF BAILING DPRK OUT OF CREDIT MESS, ALTHOUGH MINOR  
ADJUSTMENTS ARE NOT TO BE EXCLUDED. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBOFF CALLED AUG 5 ON SOVIET MFA FIRST FE DIVISION  
COUNSELOR ALEKSEY DMITRIYEVICH PUTIVETS AND YOUNGER  
COLLEAGUE VLADIMIR VASIL'YEVICH KLEPALOV FOR GENERAL  
EXCHANGE ON KOREAN MATTERS, AND FOLLOWING SPECIFIC  
POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED.

3. NOTING THAT SOVIET PRESS HAD REPORTED DPRK UN REP'S  
REJECTION OF SECRETARY'S FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE PROPOSAL  
IN CONTEXT OF GENERAL SOVIET SUPPORT FOR DPRK, EMBOFF  
ASKED IF PUTIVETS HAD ANY FURTHER COMMENTS ON PROPOSAL.  
PUTIVETS REPLIED THAT THIS WAS ADEQUATE DESCRIPTION OF  
MEDIA REACTION, BUT THAT OFFICIAL POSITION HAD BEEN  
SET FORTH BY GROMYKO WHEN SECRETARY HAD FIRST MADE  
PROPOSAL: IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE REAL PROGRESS  
TOWARD RESOLUTION OF KOREAN PROBLEMS UNLESS PROPOSAL  
INCLUDES WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS. HE SAW "NOTHING  
NEW" IN SECRETARY'S MOST RECENT PROPOSAL, AND POSITION  
ANNOUNCED BY GROMYKO REMAINS VALID.

4. PUTIVETS ASKED ABOUT U.S. POSITION WITH REGARD TO  
NORTH KOREAN PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT U.S. - DPRK CONTACTS.  
EMBOFF REPLIED THAT AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, PROPOSAL WAS  
UNACCEPTABLE IN ISOLATION BECAUSE IT IGNORED FACT THAT  
SOUTH KOREA MUST HAVE A VOICE IN DETERMINING FUTURE  
OF PENINSULA, AND THAT IN GENERAL CONTEXT OF PROGRESS  
IN DISCUSSING KOREAN PROBLEMS RESPONSE WOULD DEPEND  
SUBSTANTIALLY ON ATTITUDE OF NORTH KOREA'S ALLIES  
TOWARD RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA. HE ASKED ABOUT  
SOVIET CONTACTS WITH SOUTH KOREA, AND PUTIVETS REPLIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03    MOSCOW 12462 061726Z

THAT NOTHING HAD CHANGED IN THIS RESPECT. EMBOFF  
CONTINUED THAT PROPOSALS TENDING TO ISOLATE SOUTH KOREA  
WERE AS UNCONSTRUCTIVE AS DEMANDS FOR U.S. TROOP WITH-  
DRAWAL PRIOR TO ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW NEGOTIATED AGREE-  
MENT, SINCE ARMISTICE ACCORD WAS PRESENTLY UNIQUE  
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT SUPPORTING STABILITY IN THE  
PENINSULA. TO THIS PUTIVETS REPLIED THAT PRESENT  
SITUATION WAS IN FACT STABLE AND THAT MAIN TASK WAS

TO FIND WAYS TO ADVANCE SOLUTION OF EXISTING PROBLEMS  
WITHIN THAT CONTEXT.

5. EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT SOVIET-DPRK ECONOMIC RELATIONS FOLLOWING KONG JIN TAE VISIT (SINGAPORE 3489), NOTING THAT THERE WAS SPECULATION IN SOME CIRCLES THAT WIDENING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE GAP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON DPRK EFFORTS ON KOREAN QUESTION IN DIPLOMATIC FIELD, AND THAT DPRK MIGHT FEEL CALLED UPON TO ASK FOR SOVIET BAILOUT ON CREDIT FRONT. PUTIVETS REPLIED THAT BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WENT FORWARD ON TWO PLANES. BILATERAL TRADE TURNOVER HAD BEEN ALMOST THE SAME IN 1974 AND 1975, AND THE TWO SIDES WOULD BE LOOKING AT 1976 RESULTS TO SEE WHETHER EFFORTS TO INCREASE IT SOMEWHAT HAD BORNE FRUIT. IT WAS PERHAPS NATURAL THAT TRADE IS NOT INCREASING AS FAST AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, GIVEN DPRK EFFORTS TO DIVERSIFY TRADE BY INCREASING EXCHANGES WITH CHINA AND CAPITALIST COUNTRIES. THE SECOND PLANE WAS LONG-TERM TECHNICAL COOPERATION INVOLVING SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN BUILDING COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS. THIS TOO WAS INCREASING, AND WAS GOING MORE AND MORE TO A SO-CALLED "COMPENSATORY" BASIS, WITH PAYBACK IN GOODS; HOWEVER, MUCH OF THE NORTH KOREAN CONTRIBUTION WAS STILL IN EXPORTS OF TRADITIONAL GOODS TO THE USSR. KONG JIN TAE'S VISIT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPLETION OF THE SOVIET FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR SUBMISSION TO THE SUPREME SOVIET IN SEPTEMBER. IT WAS A QUESTION OF NAILING DOWN THE LAST DETAILS; TO THIS END THE SOVIETS WERE HAVING DEPUTY PREMIERS FROM MOST OR ALL OF THE "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES TO MOSCOW; AND KONG JIN TAE HAD BEEN PART OF THIS SERIES. THERE HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY NOTHING EXTRAORDINARY ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH HAD CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04      MOSCOW 12462 061726Z

BEEN LIMITED TO TRADE AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS DESCRIBED ABOVE; CREDITS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED.

6. PUTIVETS ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF NORTH KOREAN CREDIT PROBLEMS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, SPECULATING THAT IT MUST BE DIFFICULT TO SATISFY SHORT-TERM CREDITORS WITHOUT OFFENDING FIRMS WHOSE DEBTS FALL DUE LATER. EMBOFF SAID HIS INFO WAS TO PATCH TO BE WORTH REPEATING.

7. EMBOFF READ PUTIVETS UNCLASSIFIED PORTION STATES 191941 ON NOTICE TO MARINERS CONCERNING CLAIMED NORTH KOREAN SECURITY ZONE AND ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS HAD HEARD ABOUT IT. HE REPLIED THAT THEY HAD SEEN JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS BUT HAD NOT BEEN "OFFICIALLY" INFORMED

OF THE CLAIM; HE SUSPECTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT HAD MAINLY TO DO WITH FISHING.

8. IN BIOGRAPHIC LINE, PUTIVETS APPEARED TO BE IN HIS LATE 40'S AND SAID HE HAD SERVED TWO TOURS, FOR TOTAL OF TEN YEARS, IN PYONGYANG; SPOKE KOREAN BUT NOT CHINESE; HAD A WIFE AND CHILDREN; HIS ENGLISH IS GOOD BUT RUSTY. KLEPALOV, WHO SEEMED TO BE IN HIS EARLY 30'S, SAID HE HAD BEEN ON A "STUDY TOUR" WITH THE EMBASSY IN PYONGYANG.

9. COMMENT: LIKE HIS COLLEAGUE FADEYEV IN EMBASSY'S LAST CONVERSATION WITH MFA KOREAN SPECIALISTS (MOSCOW 5695), PUTIVETS PROJECTED A VISION OF STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA AND WAS VERY OBLIQUE IN SUPPORT OF DPRK REJECTION OF THE SECRETARY'S MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL. IN FACT, HE SEPARATED PRESS SUPPORT OF DPRK REJECTION FROM "OFFICIAL" SOVIET STANCE ON NEED TO WITHDRAW U.S. TROOPS PUT FORWARD BY GROMYKO. HIS COMMENTS ON SOVIET-DPRK ECONOMIC RELATIONS SUGGEST STRONGLY THAT SOVIETS HAVE NOT MOVED AND HAVE NO INTENTION TO MOVE TO BAIL OUT THE NORTH KOREANS ON THEIR CREDIT PROBLEM IF ASKED, ALTHOUGH ADJUSTMENT IN TRADE/TECHNICAL COOPERATION CONTEXT ARE OF COURSE NOT EXCLUDED. SOVIET-DPRK RELATIONS, AS HE DESCRIBED THEM, SEEM TO BE STABLE, AND ABOVE ALL CORRECT, BUT NOT PARTICULARLY CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 05    MOSCOW 12462 061726Z

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